Subjectivity as the indescribable self

I find interesting and fruitful thinking that the root of the best of our being human is when one perceives to be that himself/herself that is unique in the world and no one else has, the feeling “I”, which, if is cultivated properly, should also lead to always keeping in mind that the other, like me, feels as well his/her being an I that, as being exclusive, is ultimately impossible to express. Precisely because it is impossible to express, it is impossible to treat it as an object, therefore it is in itself protected, immune from this danger. This would therefore be the root, the starting point, to treat people not as objects, but as subjects, each one having their own dignity, freedom, creativity.

Obviously this cannot mean that, if one does not show this philosophical feeling of being an I, then he/she is not a person. The philosophical concept should serve to make me realize what is already in people, regardless of how aware they are of it. A child, for example, may not be able to demonstrate an awareness of being an I, but I can recognize in him/her that this ability is already present. It could even be recognized in animals, according to their different ways. This could help to find a reason why we should have respect for animals, people, plants, while there is no need to have any respect for objects, except for the consequences that may be on living beings. This means that the best reason for not using violence, for having respect, is not that of not causing suffering. Suffering can be objectified as well, that is, conceived as nothing more than a set of mechanisms and impulses with which nature has equipped us to react and survive. Even a computer can be designed in such a way to react as if it were suffering. The difference is that, if I do violence to a computer, there is not a “someone” who is suffering inside that computer, while, if I do violence to a plant, I feel vaguely that there are not only mechanisms that react, but a principle, even if very elementary, of being “someone”. The point is to establish what this being “someone” or being a “person” means. Now, it seems to me that the best point of reference for this question is our ability, which everyone, in different ways, can find in themselves, to feel like I, that unique and exclusive I that only you have in this world and no one else has, nor will anyone ever be able to understand, because it is yours and yours alone.
This thing can also be a spiritual practice, an exercise, a subject of prolonged meditation in silence, because having understood is not enough. We need to continually impress it on our soul, our behavior, also practicing to see if and how it can change our behavior, our life, otherwise it risks being just theory, an abstract thought that we can betray at any moment, the same way in the Bible there are continuous reproaches against hypocrisy, that is, the betrayal of one’s own faith, one’s own religion, one’s own principles. Precisely because we discover it deeply in meditation, the I also clearly reveals itself to be selfish. I discover several times that even my dreams are rather selfish. On the other hand, it is impossible to live in this world without at least a minimum of self-affirmation. In the midst of all of this, we can make our meditation on the self complete when it becomes a tool to give importance to other selves as well, otherwise it remains an exercise closed in self-contemplation, a navel-gazing.

At this point, a consideration on language will be useful. Our language, I am referring to language in general, which includes all the languages ​​of the world, forces us to form a wrong idea of ​​the self and prevents us from being aware of its most important aspect. Let’s think of any object, for example an orange. How can I describe it in such a way as to refer specifically to that orange and not to others that exist in the world? Normally we solve this problem by saying “That one, that one there”. Saying “That one there”, however, is not scientific. For example, if you want to publish a scientific research on that specific orange, you cannot write that your research is about “that orange, that one there”. How then can we be scientifically precise, to indicate a specific object without the risk of confusing it with others? At this point it is clear that the references we need are those of space and time. For example, we could say: my scientific research concerns the orange that was on planet Earth, at satellite coordinates 123445677 897765445, at 13:37, 3 seconds and 4 thousandths of a second, solar time in Italy. Ultimately, what is implied when we say “That one” is precisely this: the orange that is there (= space) at this moment (= time). Space or time alone are not enough, because tomorrow there could be another orange in the same place, or at the same moment there could be another orange 10 centimeters to the right. Instead, by combining both together, we can obtain a precision that leaves no margin for error. Ultimately, this is what we also do when we write news or history books: what we say to identify precisely who or what we are talking about can always be traced back to the combination of space and time. For example, if we say that Garibaldi was the one who led the Expedition of the Thousand, the reference works because we know where (= space) and when (= time) the Expedition of the Thousand took place, or at least we have some idea of ​​it, which can still be traced back to a space and a time. Even when there may be a lot of uncertainty about both, in any case what our mind thinks of is always some spatial and temporal reference.

Science deals with what is objective, that is, measurable, experimental, factual data independent of the subject, that is, the observer. What is subjective is instead an opinion. In order to study something, science needs to objectify it, that is to reduce it to an object, to something measurable. Even in order to study people, science needs to reduce them to objects, otherwise it has no material to study. In order to study the self, science needs to reduce it to quantifiable, measurable mechanisms, it needs to objectify it, that is, treat it as an object external to the observer, an object as unconditioned as possible by the observer, the scholar, the scientist, otherwise it cannot study it scientifically.

Every time we talk about objects, there is always a subject who is talking about them. This means that absolute, pure objectivity cannot exist. Even in science the effort to be objective is limited, because where is science there is always a scientist, that is, an observer, a subject, who conditions its objectivity. It is the classic problem of relativism: we cannot be sure of anything, because, whatever we say, there is always someone who is saying it. At this point we might ask ourselves: were dinosaurs a perfect objectivity, since there was no one to observe them? We cannot answer yes, because both the concept of dinosaurs and that of perfect objectivity are now thought by a subject. So even in this case we cannot escape the presence of a subject who limits objectivity. We might ask ourselves whether a flower that is not looked at by anyone exists. The problem is that the very concept of a flower that is not looked at by anyone is already conditioned now by whoever is thinking about it, so it is not possible to know with perfect objectivity whether it exists or not and what sense there is in existing.

What happens with science actually happens every time we speak: as soon as we give a name to an object, or even to a person, we have automatically objectified them, reduced them to thinkable objects. Instinctively we try to solve this problem by introducing our emotions, expressiveness, art, moods into language: they are ways of forcing language to say things that it cannot say in itself. The philosopher Wittgenstein said that “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”. I do not agree: when faced with things that one cannot speak of, one can try to force language to say them anyway, even if this way language loses its objectivity. This is what we do when we speak in poetry, we express emotions, exclamations, art, smiles, paradoxes, contradictions: they are all ways of forcing language to express what it cannot say in itself, which is nothing but expressing subjectivity.

Another problem that we find both in science and language in general, in addition to our need to objectify, is the lack of references to what is unique. For example, when we say “this is an orange”, we are referring to that specific orange a term that refers to all the oranges in the world and therefore completely ignores the exclusive uniqueness of that specific orange. We instinctively try to resolve this difficulty when we give proper names. For example, if I see John, it is one thing to say “This is a man”, ignoring his uniqueness, and another to say “This is John”. Both philosophers and scientists have normally been highly disinterested in the uniqueness of individual objects or individuals. This has led to enormous confusion, ambiguity, claims, illusions, but I would frankly say stupidity.
From what has been said, we can realize that it is possible to distinguish two types of constitutive elements of the self. A first type is all those elements that can be objectified. For example, character, personality, all psychological aspects. The other type is my unique sensation of feeling myself, the impression of being inside this body, which leads me to ask myself why this self of mine is the result of this body instead of another body, why I ended up here, why I was born in this period of world history instead of another.
The first type is easy to describe, to name, to objectify. The second type is entirely subjective, impossible to describe and objectify, it does not and cannot have a name, it is entirely subject to doubt whether it really exists. It corresponds to the “hard problem of consciousness” described by David Chalmers, while the first type is the “easy problem of consciousness”.

Someone might ask me: if the second type is impossible to describe, isn’t the very fact that you are talking about it, describing it, a contradiction?

There are two answers.

One is that my attempt to talk about it exploits some forcing of language, the forcing I mentioned before, which allows for the production of art, but loses the consistency and strength of objectivity.

Another answer is that, however I describe it, I base myself on the hope that those who listen to me will find this sensation of feeling “I” in their own personal intimate experience. If those who listen to me tell me that they can’t do it, that they have the impression that this second artistic I is just hot air, words made up of empty air, I have nothing to say, precisely because it is the aspect of the I that is entirely subjective. I can only find support in the fact that many authors, whether of philosophy, literature or art, have spoken in these terms, making one think that this phenomenon of feeling “I” is not something that is unique to me; on the contrary, many have already dedicated and are dedicating time and study to it, in an effort to talk about it, just as there are philosophers and scholars who say that instead they are only illusory concepts, devoid of any meaning.

In my opinion, therefore, the indescribable self is the basis of the meaning of life, of the possibility of perceiving a freedom within oneself, the basis of what makes us truly human, capable of empathy, the deepest sensitivity to try to arouse in our children, the primary content of any meditation.

The great stupidities of scientists and philosophers to whom I referred are the enormous efforts, studies, books and debates, which they have made and still make, to analyze the indescribable self, which can also be called “subjectivity”, “consciousness”, “self-consciousness”, trying to understand how this sensation is produced in our brain, by our neurons – some even try to refer to quantum physics – without realizing that, by proceeding in this way, what they are talking about is no longer the indescribable self, but automatically becomes the describable and measurable one. The only way to stay within the realm of the indescribable self, which I call true subjectivity, is to stick to a language made of forcing, art, emotions, impressions, perceptions.

The two aspects of the self, describable and indescribable, are obviously connected, in a continuous dialogue with each other.